The case is about the privatization of water in the Argentinean province of Tucumán, and its subsequent re-nationalization, which attracted major media and NGO coverage as epitomizing the drawbacks of public-utility privatization. It looks at the conflict between the Provincial Government of Tucumán and Aguas del Aconquija SA, the concessionaire.
The case is about the privatization of water in the Argentinean province of Tucumán, and its subsequent re-nationalization, which attracted major media and NGO coverage as epitomizing the drawbacks of public-utility privatization. It looks at the conflict between the Provincial Government of Tucumán and Aguas del Aconquija SA, the concessionaire.
This case uses the example of EDF and of the European liberation of energy markets to study public-utility deregulation. While by 2002, more than 80% of the EU electricity market was open to competition, France has been slowing down its deregulation process.
This case uses the example of EDF and of the European liberation of energy markets to study public-utility deregulation. While by 2002, more than 80% of the EU electricity market was open to competition, France has been slowing down its deregulation process.
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvos application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the Nordic area. Such case leads to the following questions: Why is competition policy necessary? How do you measure market power? How to define the market?
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvos application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the Nordic area. Such case leads to the following questions: Why is competition policy necessary? How do you measure market power? How to define the market?
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvos application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the Nordic area. Such case leads to the following questions: Why is competition policy necessary? How do you measure market power? How to define the market?
On March 2000, the European Commission rejected Volvos application for competition clearance of the Scania acquisition on the ground that it would give the merged firms a virtual monopoly in Sweden and a clearly dominant position in the Nordic area. Such case leads to the following questions: Why is competition policy necessary? How do you measure market power? How to define the market?