Wyser-Pratte and Vendex (B)

Published 06 Jan 2004
Reference 5212
Region Europe
Summary

Please refer to part A for the abstract.

Teaching objectives

The purpose of Case A is to allow a discussion on shareholder power and the response of the Supervisory Board in "Rhenan Capitalism" countries to this increased shareholder activism. Students can thereby discuss if they believe the motives/arguments of active investors in increasing shareholder value. Or do active investors merely look for short-term gains and a quick exit from their investment? The purpose of Case B is to allow a discussion on who is really in the best position to make strategic decisions within a company, management or shareholders? Students can discuss if they believe that active investors act in the interests of all shareholders (or stakeholders), or that they are simply looking for whatever short-term gains they can get? Does an increase in share price reflect the long term value creation potential of the company or merely give investors the opportunity to divest?

Keywords
  • CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
  • SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
  • SUPERVISORY BOARD
  • BOARD OF DIRECTORS
  • SHAREHOLDER PRESSURE
  • STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING
  • Corporate Governance
  • Investors, Stakeholders and Accountability